Showing posts with label Vicky Pryce. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Vicky Pryce. Show all posts

Tuesday, 13 May 2014

Huhne and Pryce Ordered to Pay Costs: The Cost of Being Prosecuted

Last week former cabinet minister Chris Huhne and his ex-wife Vicky Pryce were ordered to pay significant sums towards the costs of their prosecutions. What is the law on paying prosecution costs?

Huhne and Pryce

Huhne and Pryce were both sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment in March 2013 for perverting the course of justice. Pryce had accepted Huhne’s driving licence penalty points for speeding so that he could avoid a driving ban. For more information, see this article.

The prosecution made an application for Huhne to pay towards the costs of his prosecution in the sum of £108,541.15. This included £31,000 in relation to Operation Solar. Operation Solar concerned the part of the investigation considering the behaviour of barrister Constance Briscoe, who had given witness statements in support of Pryce’s assertion that Huhne had made her accept his penalty points. The prosecution later decided not to rely on Ms Briscoe’s evidence, after it became clear that it was untrue in a number of respects. Briscoe was found guilty of perverting the course of justice and sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment earlier this month for her deceit.

The prosecution also made an application for Pryce to pay towards the costs of her prosecution in the sum of £48,695.56.

In addition, a further £1,950 was sought by the prosecution for the costs of the sentencing hearing and the hearing to determine costs. This sum was to be apportioned between Huhne and Pryce.

Neither Huhne nor Pryce objected in principle to the making of a costs order against them. However, Huhne objected to paying the costs towards Operation Solar. It was argued on his behalf that the criminality or otherwise of Briscoe’s conduct required investigation once her true involvement became clear. Therefore Huhne should not have to pay for an investigation that would have occurred in any event. Further, it was argued that the prosecution barristers’ fees were unreasonable.

Mr Justice Sweeney held it would not be just or reasonable to require Huhne to pay the Operation Solar costs. However, the barristers’ fees were reasonable. It was held the just and reasonable costs for Huhne to pay was the sum of £76,000 plus £1,750 to reflect a fair apportionment of the costs for the sentencing and costs hearings. Therefore the total to be paid by Huhne was £77,750.

As for Pryce it was held the just and reasonable costs for her to pay was the sum of £48,000 plus £1,200 towards the sentencing and costs hearings. The total was therefore £49,200.

What is the law on prosecution costs?

Prosecution Costs

Section 18 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 provides that when a defendant is convicted or unsuccessful in an appeal the court may order the individual to pay the prosecutor’s costs.

As to the amount to be paid, section 18 only permits payment of an amount that the court considers ‘just and reasonable’ (hence Mr Justice Sweeney’s reference to what was just and reasonable). Further, section 18 requires the amount to be paid to be specified.

When will a prosecution costs order be made? Paragraph 3.4 of the Practice Direction (Criminal Proceedings: Costs) (2010) states that an order should be made under section 18 when the court is satisfied that the offender or appellant has the means and ability to pay. That is to say a costs order will not be made if the offender is unable to pay. It was generally thought that the amount of costs ordered should not exceed an amount which an offender could reasonably pay within a year; however, that may no longer be correct.

The position in respect of young offenders (those under 18) is similar to adults; they can be ordered to pay costs on conviction. However, there are some differences. Firstly, where a young offender is convicted in a magistrates’ court, the amount of any costs they are ordered to pay cannot exceed the amount of any fine imposed on them. Secondly, under section 137 of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, the parent or guardian of the young offender will be ordered to pay the costs for the young offender, unless it would be unreasonable to make an order for payment. But where the young offender has attained the age of 16 the court may order the parent or guardian to pay: section 137(3) of the 2000 Act. Therefore for those under 16 the parent or guardian will always be required to pay unless it is unreasonable, but may be ordered to pay where the young offender had reached 16.

Conclusion

It is often forgotten that offenders will not merely be sentenced but will often be expected to contribute towards the costs of their own prosecution, especially in the magistrates’ courts. In those cases where the defendant is wealthy, these costs can be very high, as Chris Huhne and Vicky Pryce have discovered.

Monday, 20 January 2014

Defence of Marital Coercion to be Abolished

It has been announced that the defence of marital coercion is to be abolished.

The defence was notoriously used unsuccessfully by Vicky Pryce last year, who sought to use the defence to avoid responsibility for accepting speeding points for her ex-husband, the former Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Chris Huhne. Both were subsequently imprisoned for perverting the course of justice. For more information on that story, see this article.

The Defence of Marital Coercion

As I explained in this article, the defence of marital coercion is based on an old legal presumption that any crime committed by a wife in the presence of their husband was under coercion. The presumption was abolished by section 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, but a defence remained. Section 47 provides that in any case apart from treason and murder it is a good defence for a wife to say an offence was committed in the presence of their husband under their coercion. The wife has to show on the balance of probabilities (that it is more likely that not) that their will was overcome by the coercion of the husband to commit the offence.

The defence is widely thought of as out of place in the 21st century. It can only be used by a woman married to a man. The Law Commission has said the defence is not appropriate to modern conditions. Moreover, we are all protected by defence of duress if we commit an offence (not murder, attempted murder or treason) because of a threat of serious harm.

Abolishing the Defence

The Home Office minister Lord Taylor of Holbeach has indicated the Government’s support for the abolition, which will be achieved by an amendment to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill.

The amendment was tabled last year by the eminent lawyer, Lord Pannick QC. In response to the decision to abolish the defence, he said: ‘I welcome the Government’s decision to remove an absurd law that should have been abolished a long time ago’.

Conclusion

Abolishing this defence is, in my opinion, the entirely proper thing to do. It is plainly out of date in modern times.

What are your thoughts?

Monday, 13 May 2013

Huhne and Pryce Released from Prison


Today Chris Huhne and Vicky Pryce have been released from prison following their convictions for perverting the course of justice.

They were released after serving eight weeks of an eight month prison sentence.

They were convicted after Ms Pryce accepted Mr Huhne’s speeding penalty points. He was in danger of losing his driving licence. For the full original story, see this article.

Huhne pleaded guilty on the first day of his trial. Pryce was convicted at her second trial. Her first trial collapsed following concerns about the jury. On both occasions she pleaded the defence of marital coercion.

The pair is awaiting a decision on how much of the prosecution’s cost they will have to pay. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) is claiming £108,541 from Huhne. It is claiming £48,695 from Pryce.

Home Detention Curfew

Huhne and Pryce only served one quarter of their sentences. Normally, prisoners are released on licence at the half way point of their sentence. However the Home Detention Curfew (found in section 246 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003) provides that prisoners can be released on licence earlier. Prisoners will be subject to a curfew and electronically monitored (known as ‘tagging’).

Some prisoners are exempt from the Home Detention Curfew scheme, but for those who are eligible, most prisoners will be released on Home Detention Curfew. The scheme is designed to help reintegrate prisoners back into society.

Monday, 25 March 2013

Attorney General Rejects Call to Refer Huhne and Pryce Sentences


The sentences imposed on Chris Huhne and Vicky Pryce will not be referred to the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General has confirmed.

In a letter to David Burrowes MP, the Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, rejected the MP’s call to refer the sentences to the Court of Appeal for being ‘unduly lenient’.

Huhne and Pryce were sentenced to eight months each in prison, following their convictions for perverting the course of justice after swapping speeding points. Further details on the sentences and the convictions can be found in this article.

The MP had asked the Attorney General to use his power to refer cases to the Court of Appeal where it is thought the sentence is unduly lenient. The Court of Appeal can then increase the sentence if it agrees.

In his response the Attorney General explained that his power to refer cases was ‘exceptional’ and to be used only where the sentencing judge falls into ‘gross error’. The Attorney General concluded, after reference to the sentences given in similar cases, that the sentences passed on Huhne and Pryce were not ‘characteristic of the gross error required’ for a referral to the Court of Appeal. The sentences will therefore remain the same.

The Attorney General’s letter can be read here.

For the original article on the referral by David Burrowes MP, see here.

The Law on Appealing Unduly Lenient Sentences

Sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 allow the Attorney General to refer certain sentences to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) if he or she thinks a sentence is ‘unduly lenient’. The Attorney General must obtain the leave (permission) of the Court of Appeal to make a reference to it. Leave must be applied for within 28 days of the sentence being passed. If the Court of Appeal grants leave it will then review then sentence. It can then pass a sentence that it regards as appropriate, extending it if necessary.

Friday, 15 March 2013

Huhne and Pryce Sentences Referred for ‘Undue Leniency’


The sentences imposed on Chris Huhne and Vicky Pryce have been referred to the Attorney General for being ‘unduly lenient’.

The former cabinet minister and his ex-wife were sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment on 11th March for perverting the course of justice, after Pryce accepted Huhne’s speeding points in 2003. For more information on the sentences given, see this article.

The Conservative MP David Burrowes has referred the sentences to the Government’s senior law officer, the Attorney General, for being ‘unduly lenient’. In a letter to the Attorney General the MP argues that the sentences do not reflect the ‘seriousness of the offence and the need for it to be exemplary and provide deterrence’.

The Attorney General will now have to decide whether to apply to the Court of Appeal for leave (permission) to appeal the sentences for being unduly lenient. While there are no sentencing guidelines for perverting the course of justice, the Attorney General can look at the sentences given in other cases to help him decide whether or not he believes the sentences to be unduly lenient. If the Attorney General does decide to apply to the Court of Appeal, and it agrees to review the sentences, it could increase their length. We will now have to wait to see whether the Attorney General will apply to have the sentences reviewed.

The Law on Appealing Unduly Lenient Sentences

Sections 35 and 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 allow the Attorney General to refer certain sentences to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) if he or she thinks a sentence is ‘unduly lenient’. The Attorney General must obtain the leave of the Court of Appeal to make a reference to it. Leave must be applied for within 28 days of the sentence being passed. If the Court of Appeal grants leave it will then review then sentence. It can then pass a sentence that it regards as appropriate, extending it if necessary.

What do you think of the length of the sentences?

Monday, 11 March 2013

Huhne and Pryce Jailed for Perverting the Course of Justice


Former cabinet minister Chris Huhne and his ex-wife Vicky Pryce have been jailed for eight months each for perverting the course of justice.

The pair were jailed after she took driving licence penalty points for him after he was caught speeding near Stansted in 2003.

Huhne had previously pleaded guilty to the offence just before his trial began. He was given a 10% discount off his sentence for his plea of guilty. Otherwise he would have been sentenced to nine months.

Pryce, however, pleaded not guilty and claimed the defence of marital coercion, arguing that Huhne forced her to accept the points on his behalf. The jury at her first trial were unable to make a decision but a second jury found her guilty after twelve hours of deliberations.

The judge, Mr Justice Sweeney, told the pair that the only good that had come out of the process was that they had now both been brought to justice for their joint offence. He told them that ‘[a]ny element of tragedy is entirely your own fault’. He said that Huhne had lied ‘again and again’ and had fallen from a ‘great height’. The judge described Pryce as ‘controlling, manipulative and devious’ but said that Huhne was ‘more culpable’ for the offence.

Huhne and Pryce were told by the judge that they would serve half of their eight-month sentences, unless they were released earlier under supervision.

Meanwhile, the CPS has said that the cost of Huhne’s prosecution was £79,015 and Pryce’s was £38,544, totalling £117,558. It is seeking to reclaim those costs. The CPS is also seeking to recover a further £31,000 from Huhne for costs resulting from his attempt to have the case stopped.

For the original article on this case, see this article.

For discussion of Ms Pryce’s first trial and the issues surrounding the jury, see this article.

For the article on Ms Pryce’s conviction, see this article.

Some Notes on Sentencing

It is common practice for defendants who plead guilty to be given a ‘discount’ on their sentence. This is to reflect that a guilty plea prevents witnesses from having to go through the stressful experience of giving evidence and that a guilty plea saves the need for a costly trial. When a defendant pleads guilty at the earliest opportunity they can be given one third off of their sentence. When a defendant pleads guilty after the trial date is set they can be given up to one quarter off of their sentence. If a defendant pleads guilty just before the start of a trial (as Huhne did) or after the trial has started they can be given up to a tenth off of their sentence.

Most prisoners are eligible for release after serving one half of their sentence. But this depends on the circumstances. Some prisoners are also eligible to be released before they have served one half of their sentence, and will be subject to a curfew and electronic monitoring (known as ‘tagging’). Again, this depends on the circumstances.

What do you think of the sentences? Were they too long? Alternatively, do you think they were too short?

Thursday, 7 March 2013

Pryce Guilty of Perverting the Course of Justice

Today the ex-wife of former cabinet minister Chris Huhne has been found guilty of perverting the course of justice for accepting his speeding points.

Vicky Pryce, 60, was convicted at Southwark Crown Court in London. The jury accepted the prosecution’s case that Ms Pryce falsely accepted Mr Huhne’s speeding points back in 2003 so that he would avoid prosecution. Mr Huhne already had 9 penalty points on his licence and faced losing it if he accumulated 12 points. Mr Huhne previously pleaded guilty to the offence in February, after initially claiming he was innocent.

Ms Pryce had adopted the little used defence of marital coercion at her trial, claiming that Mr Huhne coerced her into accepting the points and was present at the time when she accepted them. The jury rejected this, however. The court had heard that Ms Pryce wanted to expose Mr Huhne after he admitted an affair. In an email to a Sunday Times journalist, Pryce had said she wanted to ‘nail him’. For more information on the facts of this case and the defence of marital coercion, see this original article: http://lawscapeuk.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/perverting-course-of-justice-and.html

The verdict came after 12 hours of deliberations. This was a retrial of the offence after the first trial was stopped when the jury failed to reach a decision. The judge, Mr Justice Sweeney, had expressed concern about the first jury’s ‘fundamental deficit in understanding’ of the trial process. For more information about the first trial and the concern about the jury, see this article: http://lawscapeuk.blogspot.co.uk/2013/02/perverting-course-of-justice-again-can.html

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) has said that costs in the case amounted to £100,000. It said that Chris Huhne challenged the prosecution and then pleaded guilty at the last minute, which was expensive. The CPS has said it intends to apply for the costs of the case to be ordered to be paid by Huhne and Pryce.

The judge has told both Pryce and Huhne that they should be under ‘no illusions’ about the likely sentence they will receive. Perverting the course of justice is a serious offence and it is often punished with imprisonment. The pair will be sentenced at a later date. In the meantime they both remain on bail.

What sentence do you think Huhne and Pryce should be given? Do you think accepting speeding points for another person is a serious offence? Should the pair be given harsher sentences because of their high profile positions? 

Tuesday, 26 February 2013

Perverting the Course of Justice, Again. Can We Trust Juries?


Yesterday a fresh trial began in the case of Vicky Pryce, the former wife of Chris Huhne alleged to have accepted speeding points on his behalf. For the original article on the trial and the relevant law, see here:

Ms Pryce’s original trial was abandoned last Wednesday after the jury was discharged following their inability to reach a verdict. The judge, Mr Justice Sweeney, had received a note from the jury saying it was ‘highly unlikely’ they would be able to reach a verdict. The jury had earlier been directed that the judge would accept a majority verdict made by at least 10 of out of the 12 jurors.

Considerable concern was expressed at some of the questions asked by the jury. The jury asked a list of 10 questions, which included a request for further definition of what is meant by being convinced ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ of the defendant’s guilt and whether they could make their decision based on reasons not presented in court or supported by the evidence. The judge said that some of these questions showed a ‘fundamental deficit in understanding’ by the jury of its role and that he had never come across anything like it in 30 years of criminal trials.

Now it is not rare or exceptional for juries to ask questions. But it is rare for a judge to be critical of a jury. And it is completely exceptional for a jury to so fatally misunderstand its role. After all there can be few of us that think we can reach a verdict in a criminal trial based on reasons not presented in evidence. If we could what would be the point of having evidence?

In the wake of this story there has been much discussion about whether we can still trust the jury system. Some have suggested that jurors should meet have to meet a minimum educational standard. So should we be concerned about the jury system? Does it need to be modified extensively?

For me at least the answer is a resounding ‘no’. This was an extremely rare case. Juries often deal with considerably more complex cases without difficulty. No injustice was caused in this case; as soon as the issue with the jury was clear the trial was abandoned and a retrial ordered. Moreover if the jury had found Ms Pryce guilty and there was concern about the conviction then there could have been an appeal to the Court of Appeal, which would have overturned the conviction if it was satisfied that it was ‘unsafe’. The system provides protection from miscarriages of justice. Furthermore, if we did decide, for example, to impose an educational requirement on jurors what requirement would we choose? And who would we entrust to decide that requirement? Perhaps the only thing we need to be sure of is that jurors must have a good command of English because of the complexity of the language sometimes used in trials. Maybe, with our increasingly diverse society, this will have to be seriously considered in the future.

The jury system has worked for hundreds of years and we are rightly proud of our right to be tried fairly by a jury. I am sure we will be proud of it for many years to come. In the meantime, we can await the new jury’s verdict in Ms Pryce’s case.

Do you think we should retain the jury system? Does it need modifying? 

Wednesday, 6 February 2013

Perverting the Course of Justice and Marital Coercion


This week former cabinet minister, Chris Huhne, has pleaded guilty to perverting the course of justice by allowing his then wife to take speeding penalty points for him in 2003.

Huhne, who has now also resigned as an MP, accepted that he wanted to avoid the penalty points because they would lead to him losing his driving licence when added to the penalty points he already had. He now faces a possible prison sentence.

Meanwhile, his former wife, Vicky Pryce, continues to deny that she perverted the course of justice. It is alleged that she informed the police she was driving the vehicle when it was caught speeding so that Huhne avoided prosecution.

The court heard that the speeding offence only became public knowledge in 2011 after Huhne told Pryce about an extra-marital affair. The court was told that Pryce wanted revenge for the affair and provided the story to the Sunday Times to ‘nail him’.

Pryce will now use the marital coercion defence. She will have to prove that she was pressured by Huhne into accepting the speeding penalty points on his behalf. The trial continues.

Marital Coercion

The defence of marital coercion is a curious one, based on an old legal presumption that any crime committed by a wife in the presence of their husband was under coercion. The presumption was abolished by section 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925, but a defence remained. In any case apart from treason and murder it is a good defence for a wife to say an offence was committed in the presence of their husband under their coercion. The wife has to show on the balance of probabilities (that it is more likely that not) that their will was overcome by the coercion of the husband to commit the offence.

It is worth asking if we think such a defence is justified in the 21st century. After all we are all protected by defence of duress if we commit an offence (not murder, attempted murder or treason) because of a threat of serious harm. The Law Commission, the body that reviews the law, has called for the abolition of the defence, saying it is not suited to modern conditions. I certainly agree.